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SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE:
A POLICY OF DETERRENCE?

BY

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Author's Note

This research has concentrated mainly on sources published by the Soviet state. After an initial examination of secondary materials covering a range of interpretations, focus shifts to these Soviet publications, including military-theoretical journals and official Communist Party documents and records. Many of the translations of these primary Soviet sources are original, and the author feels certain this practice lends the thesis credibility. Thanks go to Professor Roger E. Kanet for his guidance and support.

[redacted]

A discussion of Soviet military thought, policies or doctrine must be preceded by an assessment of Soviet attitudes towards the concept of war. As a socialist state, the Soviet Union perceives itself, as well as the rest of the world, in a manner fundamentally different from our own. Soviet thinking in matters of war and peace expresses this difference more completely than in any other area. War for the Soviets is an expression of class conflict. It is a conflict imposed upon the popular masses by the bourgeoisie. Extending this notion to relations among states, war is the expression of a conflict between an imperialist state and a socialist nation. According to the objective laws of history, the imperialist nation by nature will initiate this conflict against the socialist camp with the purpose of destroying it. Because of these objective laws of history, the socialist state is incapable of initiating a war against the imperialist (capitalist) nations. This class-oriented nature of war, as the Soviets see it, is at the hub of the political importance which they attach to the concept of armed conflict. It follows that, because of the historically predetermined destiny of the socialist nations, a war between imperialistic capatalism and socialism is of enormous political importance: Because of the interrelation between politics and war, socialist victory is inevitable by the laws of history.

the Soviets approach war is an extremely serious and theoretical matter. These subjective laws of history which define the political content of war, with its assertions regarding imperialist aggression and ultimate socialist victory, are themselves components of an entire set of political beliefs upon which the Soviet regime lends its legitimacy.

Many observers in the West have refuted the applicability of the fundamental Clausewitzian dictum in the nuclear age. Because of the exponential increase in the destructive capabilities of weaponry, a nuclear war can no longer be interpreted to be a continuation of politics by other (violent) means. It is asserted that a nuclear weapon is no rational instrument of policy. In light of the pervasive influence of the MAD theory in the West, self-annihilation could not possibly be considered "politics," rather, it is insanity. Thus, many in the West have tended to view nuclear war as divorced from politics. For the Soviets, however, technology and its developments such as nuclear weapons do not change the essential political content of war. Regardless of destruction, war is still the political expression of conflict between imperialism and socialism. The Soviet approach to the concept of war does, however, distinguish between war as a continuation of politics by violent means and war as a feasible instrument of policy. According to Robert L. Arnett, many Western analysts, such as Richard Pipes, have failed to distinguish

[illegible] these views were published,[1] Arnett goes on to cite evidence that Soviet writings on the subject do indeed recognize that nuclear war ". . . is a continuation of politics because it is a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism which helps to explain their theory of the causes, nature and essence of war."[2] But, Arnett argues, Soviet statements from both the civilian and military sectors explicitly acknowledge that the initiation of nuclear war is not a practical instrument of policy. A survey of available sources including Marxism Leninism on War and Army, Kommunist Vooruzhennuvth Sil, and Voennaiamysl substantiates this.

Soviet recognition that the initiation of nuclear hostility is of dubious value in terms of an instrument of policy is significant. They recognize the destructive capabilities in the nuclear age; this implies further recognition that both parties to a nuclear conflict would suffer extensive losses. Yet their assertions concerning the inevitable political content in any war provides the observer with helpful insight into the manner in which the Soviets approach the concept of war in general. War is politics. Politics for the Soviets is, in the realm of war, the pitting of one state against another, with the class orientation of the Soviet state determining the outcome, according to objective laws of history:

> In the new war, if it should be allowed to happen, victory will be with the countries of the world socialist system which are

Extension progressive, ascending tendencies

Nuclear weapons have transformed the nature of armed conflict, but the political content of that conflict is for the Soviet Union ever present. The political content of war has to a large degree manifested itself in the political content of Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet strategic doctrine encompasses a hierarchy of components of the Soviet approach to armed conflict. Strategy is subordinated to doctrine; actual procedural elements of strategy are determined by the political requirements of that doctrine. Strategy, therefore, defines tactics and military art. Throughout the following analysis of the structure and function of Soviet strategic doctrine, its political content will become evident. Note that the political requirements for Soviet strategic policy are unique; an objective appraisal of these requirements is essential.

Soviet Strategic Doctrine in Perspective

Soviet strategic defined policies have been under Western scrutiny since the late 1940's when the American "atomic monopoly" was broken by a successful Soviet nuclear explosion. What the Soviet leadership thinks about nuclear war is of fundamental importance in terms of the strategic policies of the United States as well as other western powers. Concern exists over whether the Soviet Union adheres to an interpretation of the strategic nuclear face-off which is similar to western views. Do the Soviets accept a policy of deterrence and, if so, do they perceive deterrence in the same light as the Americans? If not, what constitutes the Soviet conception of strategic deterrence? In addressing these questions, most observers agree that the best way to approach the issue is with an examination of Soviet strategic doctrine.

The pitfalls which plague any examination of Soviet strategic doctrine are numerous. An accurate estimate of its components is possible only through an analysis of assorted literature on the subject, examination of public policy statements by individuals comprising the Soviet leadership, and, finally, a survey of actual strategic capabilities of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Such tasks are by no means clear cut. Most discussions of strategic policy are found in Soviet military-theoretical journals,

although several books published by Soviet strategic theorists are considered authoritive by most Western analysts. Soviet public policy statements aimed at Western audiences are perpetually under suspicion; such statements are often times misleading. The Soviets have both overestimated and underestimated their own st ategic capability since acquiring a nuclear arsenal.

Complication and confusion also arises when attempts are made to estimate the importance and influence of Soviet strategic doctrine in actual Soviet decision making. Once we have identified the actual content of doctrine, evidence must be provided to prove that strategic policy decisions actually conform to, and arise from, Soviet strategic doctrine. The question must be asked: Does strategic doctrine beget strategic policy? If the answer is a qualified "yes," which elements of doctrine carry official sanction, and which do not? Furthermore, what purposes might Soviet strategic doctrine serve aside from the primary tasks of guiding weapons procurement and outlining operating procedures? Evidence indicates that Soviet strategic doctrine does indeed serve other purposes; this will become clearer as specific tenets of the doctrine are identified and explained. As doctrinal content is revealed, its implications on Soviet defense policy will be discussed. Finally, Soviet strategic doctrine will be paralleled with components of its Western counterpart.

Section 1: Doctrinal Development

The most useful approach in examining the content of Soviet strategic doctrine is to survey its historical development, identifying tenets as they are incorporated into the abstract set of notions which comprises doctrine. Perhaps the most identifiable factor fueling the evolution of Soviet strategic doctrine is weapons technology, although a score of influences have played a role in doctrinal development throughout its history. Initial attention will be paid to the final years of the Stalin regime, for, although "Stalinist military science" has undergone substantial revision, its ideological and nationalistic underpinnings continue to color Soviet strategic doctrine in the nuclear age.

The stifling of debate and initiative which characterized the Stalinist regime is perhaps most evident in the development of Soviet military doctrine in the years immediately following the Second World War. Stalin's absolute preeminence within the military hierarchy facilitated his own monopoly in determining and outlining the theoretical foundations of military doctrine and the strategy, tactics and operational art which are subordinated to it. Stalinist military doctrine was in force throughout the post WWII years and even continued several months after his death. It was a nationalistic, ideology-serving set of guiding principles outlined in the "Permanently Operating

Factors" (POF's). Stalin referred to the POF's in a February address to the Soviet nation after the 1942 German invasion. The POF's consisted of ". . . the stability of the rear, the morale of the troops, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armaments of the army, and the organizational ability of the command personnel of the army."[4]

The circumstances in which Stalin codified and announced his POF's are important in understanding tenets of Soviet military doctrine distinctly unique to the Soviet state, and the fundamental influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Soviet military thinking. Soviet military response to the surprise German invasion came only after weeks of vacillation and indecision. It was clear that the German forces had gained a significant strategic advantage by utilizing the element of surprise in their attack. To concede that the German army, fascist and imperialist, had gained a quick and substantial advantage over a state with a superior social system and consequently a superior military capability was impossible. Such a concession would not only amount to an admittance of a lack of Soviet preparation and foresight, but would also pose a substantial threat to the viability of several ideological tenets. Stalin's solution was to downplay drastically the significance and value of surprise in warfare, deeming it a "transitory factor;" the POF's were to determine the true outcome of a conflict. The defeat

of the German army by the Soviets in 1945 reinforced Stalin's doctrine. That the POF's constituted the mainstay of Soviet military doctrine until 1954 in spite of the technological "revolution in military affairs" facilitated by nuclear weapons reflects the dictator's dominance in the realm of military thought.

Before examining this "revolution in military affairs," it is clarifying to consider the fundamental influence of ideology on Stalinist military doctrine. Stalin maintained that the POF's, applicable to any national army, were clearly on the side of the Red Army. This was true because of the Soviet Union's superior social system, as well as the fact that the U.S.S.R. was ". . . not waging a predatory nor imperialistic war but a war which is patriotic, liberating and just."[5] Stalin further emphasized the superior Soviet morale, economy and armaments. Thus the impact of ideology on Stalinist military thinking was substantial. This ideological, as well as nationalistic, influence has continued to play a role in the development of Soviet strategic doctrine. As the various tenets of post-Stalin doctrine are examined this will become evident.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device in 1949, marking the beginning of what the Soviets eventually termed a revolution in military affairs. The revolution, caused by an exponential increase in the destructive capacity

of weapons, was not publicly debated until after the death of Josef Stalin because of reasons previously discussed. However, lack of debate about the implications nuclear weapons would have for doctrine by no means indicated a Soviet underestimation of their potential value. Soviet nuclear programs and the necessary institutions to oversee research and production were initiated before WWII.[6] Many have argued that the strategic force structure of the late fifties and even early sixties was the result of decisions made during Stalin's lifetime.[7] The reasons for the lack of a corresponding doctrinal development probably center around the cult of personality and Stalin's utter domination in military affairs. Furthermore, as far as Stalinist military theory was concerned, no single development in weapons technology could substantially alter the significance and applicability of a doctrine based for the most part on a superior Soviet social system as well as a predetermined historic destiny. Yet the advent of nuclear weapons had indeed changed some of the traditional characteristics of armed conflict; it was simply a matter of time before Soviet doctrine embraced this reality.

Shortly after the death of Stalin an onslaught of debate over doctrine occurred in many of the leading military-theoretical journals. In view of the tight party control and oversight of the Soviet press, it is likely that this debate over doctrine was encouraged by

the CPSV. Many began to challenge the applicability of Stalin's POF's, in spite of their ideological attraction. The main point which was disputed was the issue of surprise. According to some, surprise had become extremely important and perhaps even decisive due to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons as well as future prospects for their delivery. The increased utility of surprise on the strategic level, however, posed a direct challenge to the Permanently Operating Factors.

Most Western analysts and scholars agree that the earliest significant challenges came from Major General Talenskii, a former editor of the Ministry of Defense daily, Krasnaiia Zvezda, (Red Star), and at that time the editor of the leading Soviet military-theoretical journal, Voennaiia Mysl', (Military Thought). Some have suggested that Talenskii's rank and responsibility implies that he enjoyed a substantial amount of official backing at the time.[8] Talenskii argued that the POF's were important, but not central, to military affairs of the day. The POF's were losing ground. The first concrete challenge to Stalinist military doctrine came, then, in the explicit recognition of the value of surprise in modern warfare, and the qualitative accomodation in doctrine which should logically follow.

After Talenskii, numerous challenges to Stalinist doctrine were found throughout the Soviet press, and by 1956 references to the POF's were virtually nonexistent.

The barrier to a real examination of the fundamental change which had occurred in military affairs had finally been lifted. Limitations on Soviet military thinking had been significantly reduced. As the importance of surprise in modern warfare became an accepted fact, considerable attention was given to the implications this would have on doctrine, strategy and, ultimately, force structure. The initial period of a war thus became an issue of central importance.

As increased attention was given to the notion of surprise and the initial period of a war, the issue of pre-emption gained widespread consideration as well as support, especially in the military sector. The military-theoretical journal, Voennaiia Mysl', considered the most authoritative by Soviet standards, began to endorse the view that the Soviet Union should develop a pre-emptive nuclear strategy and capability. A surprise attack was recognized, in an objective strategic sense, as fundamentally relevant to the outcome of a nuclear war. Furthermore, a surprise attack was presented as a primary goal of the "imperialists," who were ostensibly planning to wage a preventive war against the socialist nations.* The ideological influence on this facet of Soviet doctrinal development is unmistakable. By its own definition the

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*A preventive war may be defined as a war initiated in order to preclude any possibility of a similar attack from the enemy. A pre-emptive attack involves attacking the enemy first, once it becomes clear that an attack is imminent.

Soviet Union is a nonaggressive social system. The United States as well as the rest of the capitalist camp are by that same definition imperialist and aggressive. Because of plans by the U.S. to wage a preventive war against the U.S.S.R. by means of a surprise first-strike, it was clearly necessary for the Soviets to develop the means to pre-empt this surprise attack when it appeared imminent.

After a policy of pre-emption was advocated by an increasing number of military officers, an editorial appeared in Voennaia Mysl' which could not have been clearer:

> We cannot ignore the lessons of history and we must always be ready for pre-emptive actions against the perfidy of the aggressors.[9]

In the months following this 1955 editorial, articles advocating a policy of pre-emption, and therefore its incorporation into strategic doctrine, became widespread. Other publications such as the Military Herald and Krasnaia Zvezda endorsed a policy of pre-emption.[10] In sum, then, as far as the military sector was concerned, pre-emption was a necessary tenet of Soviet strategic doctrine.

A policy of pre-emption was perhaps the first significant addition to Soviet doctrine proposed by the military since the initial recognition of the increased importance of surprise. For the purpose of this analysis it is essential to determine 1) whether pre-emption was accepted as policy by the Soviet political leadership,

and thus incorporated into official strategic doctrine, and 2) whether Soviet strategic weapons development programs were geared towards the attainment of a pre-emptive capability.

The "bomber gap" issue which circulated widely in the U.S. national security community as early as 1954 illustrates Western suspicion of the development of a Soviet pre-emptive capability. According to many Western estimates, Soviet production of jet bombers was on the upswing. In 1950, thirty Soviet TU-4's (Medium Range Bombers) were estimated to be operational.[11] By 1955 this estimate had grown to 1,100.[12] While the Soviet TU-4 could not threaten most areas of the continental United States with any credibility (Northwestern portions of the U.S. were vulnerable to one-way TU-4 missions), the TU-4 posed a serious threat to forward based bombers in Europe. Further apprehension was aroused by concurrent Soviet developments of the "Bison" heavy jet bomber as well as the "Bear" turbojet, which could directly threaten the continental United States.

The substantial build-up of Soviet bomber forces in the years surrounding the pre-emption discussion must now be considered alongside a long standing element of Soviet strategic military policy. This is the notion of counterforce military targeting. Soviet military strategy has consistently held that primary strategic objectives are, first and foremost, the enemy's armed forces them-

selves. This continues to apply in the nuclear era, as Soviet Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii has emphasized in an authoritative work, Voennaia Strategiia (Military Strategy).[13] Examined together with this element of strategy, the bomber developments of the 1950's seem consistent with the development of a pre-emptive strategy. Actual bomber production indicates acceptance by the political leadership of such a policy. Herbert Dinerstein, noted for his analysis of the early development of Soviet strategic doctrine, contends that the wide press exposure enjoyed by those advocating the development of a pre-emptive capability is in itself representative of an acceptance of the policy of pre-emption by the political leadership, in view of its close supervision of all elements of the press.[14] Further evidence of this acceptance of pre-emption as official policy may be found in Soviet ICBM development of the 1960's, which stressed extremely heavy missile payloads, a strategic necessity in counterforce targeting.

It must be emphasized that the development of a pre-emptive facet of strategic doctrine seems to be regarded by the Soviets as purely defensive in nature. This is true in spite of the fact that the force structures required for pre-emption were easily perceivable in the objective sense as offensive first strike weapons. What separates a Soviet decision to develop the first-strike counterforce capability necessary for pre-emption from any similar initiative in the United States is simply the

fact that the peace-loving socialist camp is not capable of waging an aggressive preventive war. The U.S. is viewed as planning precisely this.

The fact that a credible Soviet pre-emptive capability was in reality extremely limited at the time of these decisions is of secondary importance in terms of this analysis. For our purposes, it is essential to recognize that what was advocated initially by the military sector was eventually accepted by the political leadership, and translated into weapons development programs. Pre-emption may be considered an operational component of Soviet strategic doctrine. The strategic value of surprise in the nuclear era has been given widespread attention in the Soviet press; a pre-emptive policy is a natural, logical outgrowth of such attention. The pre-emption issue has also been utilized in this analysis of strategic doctrine as a "case study," determining leadership receptivity to a policy advocated initially by the military. However, it will become clear in later sections that the political leadership's propensity to incorporate military policy recommendations into official strategic doctrine has significantly decreased since the development of relative policy between East and West, as well as policies oriented towards political detente under the Brezhnev leadership.

Shortly after the policy of pre-emption became

firmly entrenched in strategic doctrine, several other doctrinal components were added throughout the late 1950's and into the 1960's. While much of the debate over actual doctrinal content occurred in the pages of military journals, it is useful to examine statements by the political leadership in determining those tenets with apparent official sanction. For this we must turn to policy guidelines presented at the various Communist Party congresses.

Soviet strategic doctrine began to assume a definite shape at the 20th party congress in 1956. Many of the initial Soviet statements regarding the position of nuclear weapons within the doctrinal framework were made at this time. Weapons of mass destruction were clearly intended to comprise the backbone of the Soviet defense posture relative to the West. Marshal Zhukov elaborated on strategic policy, stressing the type of war the Soviets expected should it break out:

> . . . A future war, if they [imperialists] unleash it, will be characterized by mass application of the air forces, various rocket weapons and various means of mass destruction, such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological . . .[15]

Implicit in Marshal Zhukov's statement is the Soviet concept of escalation at that time: The next war will inevitably escalate into a strategic thermonuclear war. This inevitability of escalation became a key component of Soviet strategic doctrine throughout the late 1950's

strategic thinking. Its earliest roots are found in Stalinist military science: The POF's will always be on the side of the Soviet Union. It is significant to note that while surprise has been recognized as a decisive factor in the outcome of a war, it has never been considered to be the decisive factor. Soviet doctrine holds that a superior social system cannot lose a war, conventional or nuclear. A 1964 issue of Voennaiia Mysl' explains:

> . . . no matter how high the level of military-technical progress, the basic, objective law of war, formulated by Lenin, will not cease to operate: He will gain the victory in war who has the greatest reserves, the greatest sources of strength, and the greatest support among the masses of people.[18]

For Soviet doctrine, even technological developments such as nuclear weapons cannot alter this basic law. Sokolovskii emphsizes in Military Strategy that while surprise is indeed important, political and socio-economic factors continue to play the decisive role.[19] In this sense, then, Stalin's POF's continue to bear on strategic doctrine.

Any doubts concerning the existence of the "socialist victory" axiom as a central tenet of Soviet strategic doctrine were quelled by Khrushchev's address at the 20th party congress of 1956:

> . . . it is possible to hear from the prominent statesmen of bourgeois nations the candid acknowledgement that in a war with the application of atomic weapons "there won't be a victor." These statesmen still hesitate to admit, that capitalism

> will find itself in the grave in a new world war . . .[20]

Defense Minister Malinousky echoed this idea five years later at the 22nd party congress:

> We are deeply convinced, that in this war, if the imperialists impose it upon us, the socialist camp will win, as capitalism will be destroyed forever.[21]

The practical requirements for the fulfillment of such pronouncements are numerous. Perhaps the most important of these, however, is a functional war survival capability facilitated through policies of damage limitation.

A widely publicized tenet of Soviet strategic doctrine in the West has been the well-organized Soviet civil defense program. Unfortunately, much of Western strategic thought is highly suspect of the development of damage limitation capabilities; such a policy is often perceived as veritable preparation for the initiation of a nuclear war and therefore inherently aggressive. Such perceptions seem to be supported further by evidence of a Soviet hard target first strike capability manifested in the high yield ICBM, the Soviet SS-9. However, while such strategic policies seem offensive, aggressive and incompatible with Western notions of strategic doctrine, they comprise an integral component of a warfighting doctrine and strategy. Soviet strategic doctrine has throughout its development been characterized by the

propensity to look beyond the initiation of nuclear hostilities. Development of damage limitation capabilities is a product of this Soviet attitude. As Major-General V. Matvienko pointed out in a party journal:

> The preparation of the rear of the country for defense against weapons of mass destruction is becoming one of the most decisive strategic factors in ensuring the vital activity of the state in wartime. The winning of victory in war depends in the final count on the standard of this preparation. . . . Civil defense is now a factor of strategic importance in ensuring the vital activity of the state.[22]

Endorsements of the strategic importance of Soviet damage limitation are not limited to the ranks of Soviet military officers. Civilian policy analyst Georgii Arbatov has referred to the necessity of civil defense in the nuclear age,[23] as has former Minister of Defense Grechko.[24] The late Soviet leader Leonid Breshnev endorsed a policy of a further strengthening of the Soviet Civil defense program in 1967.[25]

Damage limitation is a longstanding tenet of Soviet strategic doctrine. It is a tenet with acknowledged strategic value and crucial to a doctrine based on the concept of fighting and winning a nuclear war. As Leon Gouré has pointed out in <u>War Survival in Soviet Strategy</u>:

> They (the Soviets) believe that a capability to destroy the enemy is not sufficient for attaining victory in a nuclear war, and that it must be paralleled by a capability to survive such a war . . . such a capability . . .

> must be a logical and essential part of the Soviet military posture.[26]

Gouré is implying that the Soviet civil defense program contributes to the overall Soviet defense posture. Civil defense in Soviet doctrine not only serves the more obvious function of limiting casualties and facilitating successful conduct of the war,* but also, on a more sublime level, influences the perceptions of the enemy by strengthening the credibility of the Soviet threat, which hinges upon the ability to fight a nuclear war should it occur.

In discussing the Soviet doctrinal guarantee of successful completion of a nuclear war, it is essential to recognize possible motivations behind such declarations. While M-L ideology has in many cases failed to provide practical guidelines for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, or an accurate assessment of international political realities, it continues to play a vital role in the Soviet domestic realm. Ideology is the Soviet government's principal legitimizer, and it is not erroneous to attribute assertions of victory in a nuclear war to the maintenance of the ideology's applicability in the eyes of the echelons of officers in the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as the Soviet population at large. Moreover, claims of inevitable Soviet victory must have their affect on the perceptions of the enemy.

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*A viable population, economy and political system under the conditions of modern war is axiomatic in Soviet doctrine.

Taken in sum, these tenets of Soviet strategic doctrine formed in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the notions of pre-emption, escalation, Soviet victory and damage limitation comprise its framework. From this basis, additions and adjustments in later years will be analyzed and discussed. Doctrinal development by no means ended here. In discussing the implications and other characteristics of Soviet doctrine, it will become necessary to refer back to this basic framework.

It is clear that Soviet doctrinal development has from the outset centered around the possibility that war may be unleashed, and it is necessary to prepare for such a possibility. Because of this nature, then, Soviet strategic doctrine has been deemed a "warfighting" doctrine in many Western circles. The implications of this are vast. In light of the apparent warfighting character of Soviet doctrine, it is helpful to draw parallel with Western strategic concepts, analysing differences and similarities.

Section II: Warfighting as a Deterrent

Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty in analyzing the strategic relationship between the superpowers in the ostensible incompatibility of strategic doctrines. Soviet doctrine is many times perceived as an inherently aggressive, warmongering doctrine with its concentration on the primacy of the offensive, the necessity of damage limitation, and the winnability of a thermonuclear war. Such perceptions are unfounded. The ultimate goal of Soviet strategic doctrine is the deterrence of aggression. The difficulties arise when the means of attaining this end are examined. In the bulk of Western strategic thought, these means have traditionally centered around an invulnerable second-strike capability. Because of Western preconceptions about what a policy of strategic deterrence should entail, it is difficult for many to examine Soviet strategic doctrine on its own merits. Soviet strategic doctrine, in general terms, defines the ability of the Armed Forces to deter an attack as directly proportional to their ability to fight and win a nuclear war.

Western strategic doctrine makes key distinctions between "deterrence" on the one hand, and "defense" on the other. Many in the West perceive defensive measures such as ABM systems and civil defense programs as preparations for a first-strike and inherently "destabilizing." Yet for a doctrine involving warfighting and damage

limitation, the notion of defense is an integral part of the overall objective of deterrence. Soviet doctrine does not distinguish between these two concepts. Rather, a strong defense serves to enhance the deterrent capability of the Soviet Armed Forces. The best iteration of this notion is offered by David Holloway, in his own study of Soviet doctrine. He states, "Two themes have been stressed in this survey of Soviet thinking about nuclear war. The prevention of such a war, and preparation to wage it. In Soviet thinking these two aspects are not conflictory, but complementary."[27] Defense does not enjoy the same prominence in Western strategic doctrine because it is considered to be quite destabilising. Negative perceptions surrounding defense as an element of strategy in the West have had a detrimental effect on our own ability to consider objectively the notion of defense as a component of Soviet strategic doctrine.

An essential component of Mutually Assured Destruction is the notion of "force sufficiency." MAD recognizes that once an Assured Destruction capability is attained, further stockpiling is essentially redundant. What remains for strategic policy in this case, then, is simply to maintain the credibility of that second-strike capability. However, these notions of sufficiency are for the most part incompatible with a doctrine concentrating on warfighting. As far as Soviet strategic thought is

concerned, nothing could be more alien than a policy of "force sufficiency." This is not to assert that the Soviet Union will forever engage in a relentless military build-up. It is probable, however, that Soviet strategic policies will continue to regard international stability as contingent upon a decidedly strong and credible strategic posture. Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Secretariat of the CPSU, interprets the role of Soviet military power:

> Force in and of itself is not a vice. What is important is in whose hands it is and for what purposes it is used. Force in the hands of socialism has become the source providing peace and the weakening of military danger . . .[28]

While Ponomarev's statement bears the traditional ideological coloration concerning the justness of the socialist course and consequently socialist weapons, it is nonetheless important to recognize the implications of such an attitude. Force on the Soviet side is just; their own interpretation of this justness affects what is sufficient and what is not. For a warfighting doctrine, what is characterized in the West as destabilizing or overkill merely contributes to the Soviet deterrent posture. Essentially it is a policy of "peace through strength;" strength on the Soviet side can only contribute to further stability.

Further difficulties surrounding Soviet doctrinal embracement of the notion of force sufficiency center

around the Soviet conception of equality, or what they call "equal security." What may be sufficient for one nation may be insufficient for another. Soviet strategic posture is not only a response to the American arsenal, but those of China, Britain, and France as well. Varying geopolitical conditions generate different military-strategic requirements. The Soviet interpretation of security reflects this.

A final problem Soviet strategic doctrine has with force sufficiency hinges on the Soviet, as well as Russian, historical experience. A history of foreign military intervention and occupation has had a tremendous impact on the Soviet strategic mindset. Tsarist as well as communist policies throughout history have held that when pre-eminent militarily, state foreign policy is relatively aggressive and expansionary, aimed at eliminating or even precluding possible enemy aggression. Because of this historical experience, maintenance of a decidedly strong military arsenal is instinctual for this nation; the concept of force sufficiency is not only a relatively new aspect of military affairs, but alien to Soviet strategic thinking as well.

Western strategic doctrine has distinguished between two types of deterrence. One of these is the concept of "deterrence by punishment," which has traditionally espoused the inevitability of retaliation as the ultimate means of insuring that a deterrent relationship will

continue. Because of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, a survivable retaliatory capability was interpreted to be a much more credible means of insuring peace than any attempt at defending against a nuclear attack. This notion of defense, then, is embodied in the other type of deterrence, "deterrence by denial." A policy of denial is oriented around the belief that the best means of deterring an aggressor is by maintaining the ability to defend against any possible attack. With its stress on damage limitation and the primacy of the military target, Soviet strategic doctrine is best characterized by the notion of deterrence by denial. Such a strategy is the product of a traditional military approach to the management of defense policy. Denying the enemy victory by actively (and passively) defending against an attack is practically an axiom to the professional military mind. In the West, the "revolution in military affairs" produced by nuclear weapons prompted a qualitative shift in the manner in which armed conflict was considered. Policies moved from deterrence by denial to deterrence by retaliatory punishment, due to the exponential increase in destructive capabilities, and the implicit recognition in the West that there was no defense against these weapons. While Soviet strategic doctrine acknowledges that the emergence of nuclear weapons has prompted a re-evaluation of the nature of armed conflict in the modern era, national security management has nevertheless continued to abide by

a policy of denial. In this sense, then, Soviet doctrine does not reflect the qualitative change in armed conflict to the extent that Western doctrine has. There are several reasons for this. Probably the most influential of these concerns the attitudes and values of the individuals who discuss and formulate Soviet defense policies.

National security management in the United States is dominated by civilian actors. In contrast, the majority of the individuals who analyze and enact Soviet defense policy are members of the Soviet military establishment. As a consequence, Soviet strategic doctrine has assumed a definite traditional military complexion. This "man on horseback" legacy and its accompanying values have manifested themselves to a substantial degree in doctrine. It is because of these traditional military values that Soviet doctrine fails to embrace notions of force sufficiency, or hold Assured Destruction policies at the foundation of defense policy. Admitting that there is no defense is essentially defeatist to many Soviet strategic thinkers. Relying on a "balance of terror" as the guarantor of deterrence and international stability makes little military sense to the Soviets, predominantly because such a policy ultimately depends on the goodwill and ultimately the rationality of the enemy.

Ideological influence is also responsible in a large measure for the warfighting nature of Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet doctrinal acknowledgement that a nuclear

war would mean the end of civilization, i.e., accept the notion of MAD, would directly challenge to an ideology which guarantees a socialist victory in spite of the dict .s of technology. Western doctrine in a large sense is a product of this recognition that nuclear war is mutual suicide. MAD, as a doctrine, merely follows. A warfighting doctrine is the natural consequence of a failure to recognize that nuclear war is the end of the world.

In spite of the numerous differences between the competing strategic doctrines, the Soviets do indeed follow a policy of strategic deterrence. Soviet recognition of this notion was evident by the late 1950's. Statements by the Minister of Defense R. Y. Malinovsky indicates an acceptance of the concept of strategic deterrence as a fundamental goal of Soviet strategic policy:

> We have made the study . . . of the means of reliable repellence (otrazheniie) of a surprise nuclear attack the main task for all our armed forces, and also the means of frustration of his aggressive thoughts by way of a timely infliction of a shattering blow upon him.[39]

The latter section of this statement clearly implies the endorsement of pre-emptive policies which were widespread at that time. However, Malinovsky's opening statement is of interest in this case. In speaking of "reliable repellence" of the aggressor, Malinovsky is embracing the underlying principle of strategic deterrence. The Soviet approach to this goal, however, is simply

addressed in a different manner than it is in the West.

The nature of the deterrent function of a war-fighting strategy is further explained by an examination of major inputs to strategic thought and doctrine. The majority of these originate in the Soviet military. An examination of military pronouncements illustrates this sector's interpretation of deterrence.

As Jonathon Lockwood has pointed out, it is clear after an examination of available Soviet printed material that strategic doctrine is by no means an ironclad set of official views and interpretations of the strategic relationship between the superpowers. Considerable difficulty arises out of attempts to determine what is official policy and what is not. For example, glaring inconsistencies exist between statements made by civilian political leaders and those assertions originating in the military sector. Individuals in the West who argue that Soviet strategic doctrine is essentially aggressive frequently cite military publications as evidence. Strategic doctrine, as discussed by the military, is a warfighting doctrine, stressing the need to be constantly prepared to fight and win a nuclear war, and even develop military superiority over the enemy. Furthermore, discussion of strategic defense policies seems in most cases to be restricted to the military sector and a few related policy study institutes. Because of the virtual monopoly maintained by the Soviet military over

discussion of national defense issues, it is tempting to elevate much of what the military advocates as policy to an official level fully sanctioned by the party leadership. However, such an approach would ignore statements made by civilian political actors which in many cases weaken the credibility of the military sector as the determiner of Soviet strategic policies. Furthermore, it is evident that a strategic doctrine emphasizing warfighting and war winning serves other functions within the Soviet Armed Forces themselves, such as simply maintaining battle preparedness as well as morale. Finally, upon a thorough examination of statements emanating specifically from the military sector, endorsements can indeed be found which refer to such popular Western notions as deterrence through retaliation.

Many strategic analysts who claim that Soviet strategic doctrine is an altogether aggressive, war fighting doctrine cite authoritative military-theoretical journals such as Voennaiia Mysl' in support of their conclusions. Indeed, some of these articles in the Soviet military press leave the reader with a sense of doubt over whether the U.S.S.R. is serious about avoiding World War III. It is clear after examination that some of the articles and statements may be construed to ignore the political and technical realities of the nuclear era, asserting that victory in a nuclear war is not only possible but definite for the U.S.S.R.

It is accurate to argue that the military sector of the Soviet Union, in general terms, propounds certain views on strategic doctrine which are unique to the military. However, by no means is the military sector a homogeneous collection of individuals advocating a single monolithic policy of warfighting and superiority over the enemy, without recognition of notions of deterrence through retaliation and Assured Destruction. The Soviet military press must be examined realistically. These publications constitute a forum for debate and discussion of strategic policy. Subtle differences do exist within the military press; these inconsistencies have important implications for the actual content of Soviet strategic doctrine.

Examination of Voennaiia Mysl' reveals the existence of numerous assertions (or admissions) of policies and strategies other than those characterized by a strictly warfighting doctrine. These differing views weaken the credibility of those arguing that the military sector advocates purely warfighting policies and is ignorant of the political and technical realities of the nuclear era.

Most significant of these is an implicit recognition of the concept of Assured Destruction and its deterrent value. Such was an argument in a 1963 issue of Voennaiia Mysl':

> . . . It is impossible to request peace from the imperialists, but only possible to dictate to them by force, by the inevitability of retaliation for aggression.[30]

In discussing the assuredness of retaliation for aggression and its necessity for "dictating" peace, the author has embraced the notion of deterrence though retaliation, a central tenet of Western doctrine. With respect to Soviet strategic doctrine as a whole, it is essential to recognize that the notion of retaliation, while not central to doctrine, is nonetheless a facet. This point is further clarified in another Voennaia Mysl' article:

> The countries of socialism and especially the Soviet Union . . . must maintain in peacetime adequate and fully combat ready forces designed for repelling a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the probable enemy and delivering an immediate retaliatory strike . . .[31]

In this case we find a direct reference to the "peacetime" function of strategic forces, namely the deterrence ("repelling") of an attack. Furthermore, the notion of a retaliatory strike has again been embraced. Thus it is clear that the recognition of Western strategic notions does exist in Soviet doctrinal discussion. The military sector does not propound strictly aggressive, warfighting policies.

For purposes of comparison as well as analysis, it is also not difficult to find more "hawkish" policy views. Colonel M. Popov argues in a 1964 edition of

Voennaiia Mysl':

> . . . the attainment of success in battle in nuclear war, too, requires the securing of superiority of forces over the enemy . . .[32]

The purpose of the preceding comparison of statements within the military press, specifically the most authoritative of these, the restricted journal Voennaiia Mysl', is to illustrate that differences do exist within the military. It must be recognized from this comparison that nation of deterrence by retaliation, while complimentary to the concept of warfighting, are nonetheless components of Soviet strategic doctrine.

Recognizing that concepts such as deterrence by retaliation are present in Soviet strategic thought raises on important issue. The Soviets are indeed aware of the deterrent function of the maintenance of an AD capability. Yet clearly Soviet doctrine holds that such a policy is by itself insufficient. Perhaps the most fundamental motivation for a warfighting doctrine espousing such notions as damage limitation, pre-emption and counter-force targeting is the belief that relying on a policy of strategic deterrence through the maintenance of an adequate second strike capability lacks real credibility. Herein lies the main problem Soviet strategic thinkers seem to have with the Western notion of MAD. The Soviet leadership, especially the military, feels that no state can credibly threaten war if they feel it is, in reality, suicidal.

MAD as a doctrine is incompatible with Soviet military thinking. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is by examining a period of Soviet doctrinal development in the mid-1950's.

One of the most revealing facets of Soviet doctrinal development was a step towards the acceptance of a concept resembling Mutually Assured Destruction by a portion of the political leadership. This occurred during the leadership struggle between Khrushchehev and Malen'kov between 1954 and 1956. In early 1954 G. M. Malen'kov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers. For a very short period of time, he made several references to what is today a central tenet of MAD. With the "revolution in military affairs," according to Malen'kov, the possibility for a lasting peace had finally arrived. He reasoned:

> . . . The Soviet government stands for further relaxation of international tension, for a firm and lasting peace and resolutely opposes the policy of cold war for this policy is a policy of preparation for a new world holocaust, which, with the present means of warfare, means the destruction of world civilization.

Malen'kov had embraced the notion of mutual destruction. His was a departure from the traditional Soviet perspective of its own historical destiny, namely, the inevitable victory of socialism over the forces of capitalism. Furthermore, however, Malen'kov's stance had ominous implications for the role of the Soviet Armed Forces. His assessment of the current state of affairs posed a significant

challenge to much of what was at that time being espoused in the military press.

At this point Soviet strategic doctrine seems to have become a practical instrument for obtaining support and influence within the domestic power struggle which ensued. While Malen'kov stressed that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides had implicitly reinforced the prospects for peace, Khrushchev continued to stress that the capitalist block was preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. Nikolai Bulganin stated at that time:

> . . . we do not have the right to waste time . . . it is well known that he who does not go forward falls behind; and the backward are beaten . . . we must always be ready to give a crushing rebuff to any enemy no matter what he possesses . . .[34]

By 1956 Malen'kov had been twice demoted, and it became clear that "the destruction of world civilization" was not going to form the backbone of any Soviet defense policy. The brief challenge to Khrushchev by the Malen'kov-Molotov-Kaganovich faction a year later failed, as Khrushchev enjoyed the support of Marshal Zhukov and the Armed Forces. Clearly the military supported not only a defense build-up but a strategic doctrine which excluded any notion of inevitable or mutual destruction. Malenkov's influence may have been visible in the declared Soviet defense budgets of 1955 and 1956; both were smaller than the preceding years.[35] However, by 1957, defense

spending began to increase.[36]

The warfighting character of Soviet strategic doctrine is not only a product of influences within the U.S.S.R. Attention must be paid to its external influences. U.S. strategic policies play a significant role. The next section explains this. The military support finally awarded Khrushchev in this leadership struggle with Malen'kov hinged in large measure on the candidates' perceptions of U.S. policy and the reaction of the Soviet military to these perceptions.

Section III: Soviet Threat Perceptions

It is difficult to appreciate Soviet strategic doctrine without considering U.S. strategic doctrine and its impact on Soviet perceptions. Soviet strategic doctrine is, in a very real sense, influenced by the manner in which U.S. strategic policies are perceived by the Soviet leadership. Any strategic doctrine is geared to meeting a threat; the nature of that threat must be reflected in the doctrine which answers to it.

In January of 1954 the American Secretary of State Dulles publicized the doctrine of "massive retaliation." As a counter to Soviet expansionism and as a complement to a policy of containment, the United States would retain the option of a strategic nuclear response in the event of even limited Soviet expansion. Massive retaliation implied an increased willingness on the part of the Americans to use nuclear weapons over a larger spread of contingencies. That the United States was capitalizing on what was at that time clear U.S. strategic superiority is of fundamental importance in understanding Soviet perceptions of the political applications of strategic military power. Jonathon S. Lockwood, in a recent book, The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine, stresses correctly that Soviet perceptions of the political value of strategic capability, and the ability to threaten credibly its use, were shaped during the period of U.S. strategic superiority

and the doctrine of massive retaliation which accompanied it.[37] Lockwood stresses further that the impression left on the Soviets must have been strong:

> The Soviets perceived themselves as restrained by U.S. nuclear superiority during this period . . . with the exception of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Soviet use of military power during the period of the massive retaliation doctrine was confined to threats and military maneuvers.[38]

The impact of massive retaliation on the Soviet political and military leadership must not be underestimated. The U.S.S.R. experienced firsthand the political benefits that strategic superiority offered.

Soviet pursuance of a pre-emptive capability as discussed earlier must clearly be considered to be, in part, a result of the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation. Fears of a preventive war unleashed by the United States were exacerbated by America's latest announced policy. According to a former Marshal of Tank Forces Rotmistrov, a U.S. surprise attack could not be permitted:

> . . . the duty of the Soviet Armed Forces is not to permit an enemy surprise attack on our country, and, in the event of an attempt to accomplish one, not only to repel the attack successfully but also deal the enemy counterblows, or even pre-emptive (uprezhdayushchiie) surprise blows of terrible destructive force.[39]

Thus, an objective of Soviet strategic policy was therefore to create and maintain the ability to deliver

the first blow in a nuclear conflict. Pre-emption as a doctrinal component, then, was not only a result of 1) an ideology which held that the U.S.S.R. should expect a surprise attack, and 2) the value of military targets, but also as a result of an apparantly aggressive U.S. doctrine as perceived by the Soviets.

Another aspect of Soviet doctrinal development which is directly attributable to U.S. strategic forces and policies is what has been generally known in the West as the period of Soviet "missile deception." A primary goal of Soviet strategic policy in the years centering around the U.S. doctrine of "massive retaliation" was an attempt to undermine the credibility of U.S. strategic superiority. The 20th party congress in 1953 was a forum for the Soviet reaction to "massive retaliation." In his report to the congress that year, the Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, stated:

> . . . the Soviet Armed Forces now have assorted atomic and thermonuclear weapons, mighty rockets, and jets of various types . . .[40]

It is abundantly clear that the Soviets were attempting to deceive the U.S. concerning actual Soviet strategic capabilities. Soviet doctrinal stress on the inevitability of escalation discussed earlier also comprises an aspect of Soviet "missile deception." In reality, however, a Soviet long-range jet capability was in its infant stage.

Moreover, "mighty rockets" were not operational in the Soviet Union until the early 1960's.

Soviet missile deception seems to have reached a climax in the late 1950's. The successful launch of the Soviet "sputnik" may have lended Khrushchev's attempts to deceive the West at least a modicum of credibility. The General Secretary capitalized on this issue at the 21st party congress in 1959:

> It's quite obvious, that if the Soviet Union is able to send a rocket thousands of kilometers into space, then it is able to send, without a miss, powerful rockets to any point of the globe.[41]

Khrushchev went even further on the score, to the point of alluding to possible Soviet strategic superiority at the ICBM level:

> . . . Today, . . . when the preeminence in the development of rocket technology is on our side, we once again invite the U.S., U.K. and France: Let's prohibit the testing, production and application of nuclear weapons.[42]

It is interesting to note that such pronouncements concerning Soviet strategic prowess during this period, however false and misleading, may have had a significant impact on U.S. strategic programs. In 1961 the Kennedy administration initiated a large and comprehensive defense build-up, doubling ICBM production as well as stepping up development of the Polaris SLBM program. It is difficult to assert that such U.S. initiatives were not, to some

degree, a result of the perceived Soviet threat and capability. The impact of these measures on the Soviets was significant. Many observers single out the Kennedy programs as the stimulus for a modification which seems to have occurred in the early 1960's. The Soviet civil defense program (PVO) was reorganized in 1961, and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. According to Michael McGwire, Soviet ICBM development increasingly concentrated on more megatonnage geared to counterforce options, as well as a stepped up development of the Soviet Navy.[43] McGwire characterizes these Soviet initiatives as a shift in doctrinal content from earlier periods. Just a year before these 1961 Soviet defense policy initiatives, Soviet policies and pronouncements seemed to indicate a step towards a Western conception of mutual strategic deterrence, although such pronouncements did not go so far as to endorce mutual annihilation. In 1960, at the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev outlined forthcoming reductions in the troop levels of the ground forces:

> Our scientists, engineers and workers, occupied with the defense, have created new aspects of armament, the most contemporary . . . this gives us the chance to embark on a reduction of the Armed Forces without damage to the defense capacity of the country.[44]

Months before, at the 21st Party Congress, a new branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, were

formed. McGwire offers these pronouncements and policies as evidence of an implicit Soviet acceptance of Western doctrinal assumptions. However, it seems likelier that such policies represent not a recognition and endorsement of Western strategic concepts, but simply an increased Soviet reliance on nuclear weapons as the primary component of Soviet defense posture. The essential warfighting character is constant throughout doctrinal development. Notions of pre-emption, counterforce strategies, damage limitation and war survival are longstanding tenets of Soviet doctrine, evident in pre-1961 doctrine as well as post-1961 doctrine. What should be interpreted, then, from the reorganization of Soviet civil defense and increased counterforce and naval development is the reinforcement of a traditional warfighting doctrine, rather than a shift from one doctrinal orientation to another. It is essential to recognize for the purposes of this analysis that the increase in Soviet attention to war survival and warfighting occurring in the early 1960's is due in large measure to the perceived threat posed by U.S. strategic policies at that time. Such policies, then, intensified Soviet doctrinal concentration on strategies of counterforce and damage limitation.

It should be clear from the preceding survey of the interaction of American and Soviet strategic doctrines that any examination of a nation's doctrinal development requires at least an appraisal of its enemy counterpart.

Evidence indicates that as U.S. defense policies were increasingly geared towards higher defense spending and weapons procurement, the warfighting orientation of Soviet doctrine intensified. American development of long-range nuclear weapons in the early 1960's insured vast U.S. superiority for most of the decade. However, by the late 1960's, Soviet long-range strategic missile programs were coming to fruition. Most observers agree that Soviet attainment of relative strategic parity occurred at this time. Soviet attainment of relative parity with the United States, and its implications on Soviet behavior, perceptions and ultimately doctrine will now be addressed.

Section IV: Political--Strategic Power

The reality of relative strategic parity between the superpowers since the beginning of the 1970's has brought about significant changes in both the content and scope of Soviet strategic doctrine. These changes include a decrease in attention given to several of the traditional doctrinal tenets associated with the notion of warfighting, and an increased recognition of such concepts as strategic stability and the strategic balance, as interpreted by the bulk of Western doctrine. A manifestation of such a recognition is visible in a relatively recent addition to doctrine, that of foreign policy initiatives on the periphery, supported if necessary by military power projection in a conventional mode.

It is the purpose of this section to analyze recent developments in Soviet strategic doctrine from the standpoint of the concept of strategic parity, and its implications on Soviet thought, behavior and policies. The time period under scrutiny not only includes Soviet attainment of relative parity with the United States, but also a substantial increase in Soviet military reach as well as influence over a large portion of the globe.

Policy discussions by the Soviet leadership during the late 1950's and continuing through the mid-1960's were clearly characterized by the notion of warfighting. Espousals of pre-emptive policies and endorsements of the

winnability of a nuclear war enjoyed widespread attention in both party and military circles. In contrast, the Soviet political leadership of the 1970's and 1980's has to a large degree separated itself from several of the classic warfighting doctrinal components which dominated the majority of doctrinal development. Even the military sector, traditionally an ardent proponent of an offensively oriented warfighting doctrine has softened up in its discussion of strategic affairs.

A principal development in recent years has been the disavowal of an offensively oriented oriented doctrine. The "defensive" nature of Soviet strategic policies has proven to be a central theme:

> In counterbalance to Soviet doctrine, which is strictly defensive in nature, U.S. military doctrine emphasizes a first-pre-emptive strike, many different uses for nuclear weapons, and the possibility of a limited nuclear war . . .[45]

This statement is significant in that it denies pre-emption, as well as the possibility of applying nuclear weapons in other scenarios, as elements of strategy included in Soviet doctrine. Moreover, in associating such strategies with our offensive and aggressive doctrine, these recent pronouncements shed a sinister light on the Soviet Union's own strategic doctrine throughout its development, which advocated precisely those strategies which today's leadership condemn as dangerous. In addition

to disavowing these essentially offensive notions of nuclear strategy, the same Izvestia article practically endorsed a strategic concept which has prevailed over Western strategic thinking for decades:

> . . . Soviet military doctrine--unlike its American counterpart--has always been based, and is still based, on the principle of retaliatory--i.e. defensive actions.[46]

Soviet strategic doctrine has since its birth regarded itself as purely defensive in nature. However, the emphasis of "retaliatory" actions is significant. Throughout the development of strategic doctrine in the U.S.S.R., political and military leaders alike have referred to policies of retaliation, or second strike (AD) capabilities, as a facet of a doctrine including an entire range of tenets as well. However, strategic policy in the 1980's, as this statement clearly demonstrates, seems to have been significantly transformed. A policy of retaliation is now described not simply as a corollary of a warfighting doctrine, but rather as the basis of Soviet strategic policy. Before examining possible motivation for the preceding modifications in doctrine and policy, an additional development will be presented and discussed.

Perhaps the most fundamental component of Soviet strategic doctrine has been the axiom of a Soviet victory should a nuclear war precipitate. Indeed, the inevitability of a socialist victory has enjoyed prominence in

military affairs since the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the emergence of Stalin's POF's. Soviet rhetoric concerning victory in a nuclear war, however, has been substantially curtailed, especially in statements by the political leadership. At the 26th party congress in 1981, former Soviet leader Leonid Breshnev addressed this issue:

> . . . to attempt to be victorious over another in the nuclear arms face, to calculate victory in a nuclear war--this is dangerous madness![47]

These statements were echoed a year later by the present Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, in an ideological commentary stressing the necessity of adhering to the principle of Marxism-Leninism:

> Today, when the question of war and peace has become a question of life or death for whole peoples and for human civilization in general, these Leninist ideas have become more urgent than ever.[48]

It is essential to recognize that Andropov is arguing that a relationship characterized by mutual destruction exists between the superpowers. This is the very same view that, in the earlier stages of doctrinal development, might have earned political demise for an individual espousing it. Malenkov's dismissal is ample evidence. He supported defense policies based on the impossibility of a nuclear victory, and the military under Zhukov opposed

this. Support was given to Khrushchev as Malen'kov fell. Yet why does the Soviet leadership of today apparently endorse such a view? What has changed in the strategic relationship which might facilitate such a shift? Clearly the context in which Malen'kov stated his views is not the same as the context surrounding Andropov's statement. Why are these recent statements emanating from the U.S.S.R. considered by the Soviet leadership to be more appropriate? To explain these recent developments and provide responses to the questions posed, our attention must be directed to the concept of relative strategic parity and its impact on Soviet doctrine and policies. Notions of "parity," "stability," and "balance" have all become central themes of Soviet policy discussions concerning relations with the United States. These ideas have, in addition, all been linked to discussions concerning the negative impact of offensive strategies such as pre-emption and superiority on strategic stability and balance.

The era of U.S. strategic superiority is at an end. The Soviet strategic build-up of the 1960's and 1970's has resulted in relative strategic parity between the superpowers, and the political ramifications of this development are vast. During the period of American strategic superiority, the U.S. edge in weapons was translated into political influence (compellance) on several occasions. The Berlin and Cuban crises are two examples. As Jonathon Lockwood has pointed out, the period of

American superiority left a lasting impression on the Soviets. They have recognized the political benefits which accompany strategic strength. Soviet strategic capabilities have grown substantially, as has the Soviet ability to utilize their capability politically. With the advent of parity, the Soviet ability to utilize its own strategic power as a back-up to foreign policy initiatives and challenges has increased. Of course, they do not have all of the "elbow room" enjoyed by the United States in the 1950's and early 1960's. However, relative strategic parity has enabled the Soviets to operate in a conventional mode, below the nuclear threshold, confident that the U.S. will not interfere to the point of risking escalation. Soviet strategic thinking seems to have undergone a shift. Classic Soviet warfighting doctrine has long considered nuclear weapons as instruments of war in the operative sense. Being willing to consider them in this manner has in a large measure contributed to the Soviet deterrent posture as a whole. However, the Soviet leadership seems to have genuinely recognized the notion of nuclear weapons more as political tools of "fear" or "compellance" than practical instruments of war designed to achieve military objectives. A commentary in the authoritative journal Kommunist illustrates this point:

> Power based on nuclear weapons has begun to take on greater political functions, whereas its potential for direct application has been relatively reduced.[49]

Soviet strategic thinking has embraced a notion which is fundamental to the Western conception of deterrence, namely, that nuclear weapons are weapons with substantial political utility, but little practical military utility. This is a significant development in Soviet thought, for it is alien to the typical Soviet strategic mindset which dominated strategic thinking for several decades. Raymond L. Garthoff discusses this Soviet recognition of the political utility of strategic posture in Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age:

> While the optimum Soviet aim of the annihilation of the major center of hostile power would be deterred and frustrated (by U.S. Deterrent forces), the sub-optimum aim of improving the Soviet power position in peripheral areas would be greatly enhanced by the neutralization of the enemy power center.[50]

Garthoff's early refereones to this aspect of Soviet thought (this book was finished in 1958) have since been proven by the development of Soviet conventional capabilities, and the incorporation of their use and application into Soviet doctrine. In 1971 at the 24th Parth Congress, Breshnev referred to the necessity of Soviet support for national liberation movements.[51] Several years later, in 1974, then Minister of Defense Grechko elaborated on the new facet of Soviet policy:

> The external function of the Soviet state and its armed forces and of the other socialist countries and their armies has now been enriched with new content . . . In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively purposefully opposes the export of counter-

> revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialistic aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.[32]

The incorporation of power projection into officially endorsed Soviet doctrine is illustrated by continuing Soviet naval development. A policy of force projection would be impossible without the necessary capabilities. Soviet decisions to embark on the development of a "blue water navy" and long-range airlift capabilities must also have been the result of an altered perception of the political environment, and whether or not such an environment would be receptive to Soviet foreign policy initiatives based on conventional military might.

Essential to this argument is the nature of the political environment. Basically we are considering the international distribution of strategic power (predominantly the U.S. and U.S.S.R.), and how this strategic power influences the Soviet assessment of its own opportunities in peripheral areas. Because of the importance in calculating possible escalation scenarios when an initiative is made in areas where the U.S.S.R. may receive a challenge from the U.S., military strength on the strategic level plays a fundamental role in a nation's decision to operate conventionally in an area under dispute. Soviet attainment of relative parity with the U.S. has given the Soviets a great deal more confidence in their own ability to support

foreign policy goals with conventional military might.

With Soviet achievement of a nuclear capability comparable to that of the United States, notions of balance and stability have become key elements of Soviet strategic thinking. The Soviets have recognized nuclear weapons as instruments of political influence; reinforcing and stressing the balance of this political capital has apparently become a primary policy objective. According to Minister of Defense Ustinov, "the Soviet Union will not allow the existing balance of forces to be upset . . ."[52] Recognition of the existence of a balance on the strategic level is a relatively new aspect of Soviet strategic thinking, and implies much more than a mere endorsement of existing society in numbers. This recognition is also accompanied by an offensively oriented foreign policy in areas where superpower interests may be conflictual.

Declarations by the political as well as military leadership which apparently disavow traditional warfighting doctrinal tenets does not necessarily imply that these tenets no longer apply to official strategic policy. Pre-emption must continue to be an element of Soviet strategic policy, for their hard target counterforce capability in the 1980's is acknowledged by a variety of analysts. Soviet war survival and damage limitation strategies continue to play a large role in overall Soviet defense policies. However, reluctance on the part of the Soviet

leadership to publicize doctrinal warfighting tenets, even to the point of denying their existence, probably emanates from an increased awareness of the advantages of cooperation with the West. Policies towards political detente under the Brezhnev leadership underscore Soviet desire to reduce tension with the United States. The abrasive, confrontational rhetoric which characterized doctrinal pronouncements in the 1950's and 1960's has disappeared. In its place are pronouncements stressing cooperation and the necessity of maintaining a balance of forces.

Afterword

Soviet strategic doctrine of the 1980's is a product of decades of development. Numerous influences have shaped its evolution. A pervasive ideological influence has manifested itself in the doctrinal guarantee of a socialist victory should nuclear war occur. The ideology of the Soviet nation has also colored threat perception, and the manner in which American strategic and foreign policies are interpreted. The nation's historical experience in the sphere of relations with neighboring peoples is one characterized by foreign intervention and domination. In times of peace Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have maintained a strong defense coupled with a relatively aggressive foreign policy. A Soviet peacetime military build-up, then, is not without precedent. Another influence on Soviet doctrine is clearly the dominance of the Soviet military in policy discussions over strategic issues. Traditional military values dominate the bulk of Soviet strategic thought. Many Western strategic notions rub against the grain of these values; Soviet suspicion of the actual credibility of an Assured Destruction doctrine illustrates this point. This analysis has also demonstrated, however, that such Western notions of Assured Destruction and the maintenance of an adequate second-strike capability do occupy

places in Soviet strategic doctrine, but they are not central doctrinal tenets, and serve to reinforce a war-fighting doctrine.

Turning to doctrinal content, this analysis reveals the warfighting strategies which comprise it. The importance of surprise and the initial period of a future war have facilitated Soviet concentration on the development of pre-emptive capabilities. Stress on damage limitation and war survival policies are not only prerequisites for a nuclear victory, but also function to enhance the credibility of the Soviet strategic threat. Yet such a doctrinal orientation by no means implies aggressiveness in terms of advocating that a nuclear war should be fought. A warfighting doctrine must not be perceived as a doctrine which somehow advocates the initiation of a nuclear war. The primary objective of Soviet strategic policies is deterrence. Strategic preconceptions on the part of many Western observers have handicapped an objective analysis of Soviet strategic doctrine. Damage limitation policies and counterforce strategies are not only destabilizing, but aggressive, according to orthodox Assured Destructive theory. Yet these strategies are fundamental to a war-fighting doctrine. Soviet interpretations of the value of various nuclear strategies are decidedly alien to most Western views. For the Soviets, adequate war survival capabilities and an effective counterforce ability serve only to enhance the ability of the Soviet Armed Forces

to deter aggression. For a nation to threaten war, it must logically be prepared to wage one.

In spite of the profound differences between Soviet and American strategic doctrines, both sides are deterred from attacking one another. A relationship based upon mutual deterrence exists. Each superpower has simply reacted differently to a common problem, and the means of achieving a deterrent capability are different for each nation. But the ends are the same. Understanding the ultimate goal of Soviet strategic doctrine requires an objective examination of its tenets and their deterrent value, not one shrouded by strict Western notions of what is and isn't a policy of deterrence.

Endnotes

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[6]John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), p. 13.

[7]See Dziak, pp. 12-16.

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[9]Editorial, Voennaia Mysl', No. 3, May 1955, p. 19. Cited in Dinerstein, p. 119.

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[14]Dinerstein, p. 120.

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